encouraged by those scholars such as Jesse Lemisch, and those influenced by him, who in adopting a Marxist perspective define seafarers in primarily economic terms, placing them in a confrontational model with the capitalist society ashore which drove demand for their labour. 7 It may be significant that these scholars, while rejecting some aspects of the stereotype, still use the term 'Jack Tar' not to describe a cultural phenomenon but to refer to real seafarers. Even if the term is mostly absent from economic maritime history, here too individual seafarers are indistinct in a statistical mass. 8 In this emphasis on the isolation and homogeneity of seafarers, the three very different ways of seeing the past which primarily inform maritime history, and possibly account for the identity crisis -the nation-state focused study of navies, the quantitative approach of economics, and the trans-or even anti-national impulses of oceanic, world and global history -perhaps share more than they realize.
It is the argument of this article that these perspectives, by relying on the stereotype or by reducing seafarers' interests to primarily economic motivations, have not given sufficient consideration to critically important relationships between seafarers and shore society. What some have chosen to call the 'new maritime history', with its emphasis on the social history of seafarers, has been more attentive to interactions between seafarers and societies, but this
has not yet gone far enough. 9 These connections must be central to our investigations if we are truly to understand seafarers in history. during the early years of Britain's mid seventeenth-century revolutionary decades, when their involvement in popular politics renders their connections with society particularly clear.
Lemisch, one of the earliest leaders of the 'new maritime' movement, discussed the involvement of seamen in the American revolution, portraying them as 'outcasts, men with little hope of success ashore . . . these were the rebels' who, in reaction first to impressment then to the Stamp Act, became revolutionaries. 10 Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh have likewise described sailors as part of the 'Atlantic proletariat' which, they argue, was critical to the 'age of revolutions' in the later eighteenth century; but they also push this interpretation back to the English revolution of the sixteen-forties.
11 . Yet very little detailed work has been done on the role of seafarers in the popular politics of that decade. Indeed, naval scholars have sometimes dismissed the early seventeenth century altogether, and usually explain the fact that the royal navy sided against the king mostly in terms of internal naval affairs, or as a result of naval politics in which some officers were more successful than others in 'seizing the fleet'.
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Focusing on the outbreak of civil war in 1640-2 (depending on who you believe, either the English revolution, or the first of a series), this article explores the evidence for seafarers' involvement in the escalation into violent conflict. 13 More importantly, it asks what this reveals about their relationship to society more generally during the early modern period, especially the extent to which that relationship was shaped by their vocational maritime identity and their economic interests. To do so, it takes a broader approach and considers the experience of the maritime community, principally those based in London, throughout the reign of Charles I. Given the emphasis placed by historians on the choice of the royal fleet to side with parliament in July 1642 as a barometer of attitudes in the maritime community more generally, the article will examine the interpretations presented by historians of the reasons behind this decision, and why these are unsatisfactory. Then, it will survey the 10 Lemisch, 'Jack Tar', p. available evidence for seafarers' participation in both popular and local political agitation, comparing riots during the sixteen-twenties with those of the sixteen-forties. This evidence compellingly shows that seafarers were actively engaged in the political debates of the early sixteen-forties not only for economic reasons, or as a form of class conflict, but because of more complex social interactions, particularly through a shared religious identity. Finally, the conclusion will reflect on the implications of this particular study for the practice of naval and maritime history.
When most of the royal fleet sided with parliament in the summer of 1642, it was in immediate terms the outcome of a political wrangle over the appointment of officers. On 1
July 1642, the earl of Northumberland presented to parliament a letter from the king in which he was discharged from his post as lord admiral. 14 That same day 'for the Safety of His Descriptions of the fleet as 'seized' or 'lost' neatly encapsulate this assumption that the important political actions were taken by the commanding officers, and perhaps the captains; that the fleet was merely waiting around to be seized. Even though Stephen Greenberg, for example, argued that 'what was "lost" by the king, or "seized" by parliament, was not ships but the allegiance of those on board', this still reduces the sailors' political agency essentially to a responsive role.
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Where any analysis of the motivation of sailors in these political decisions is offered, it usually revolves around the treatment of naval sailors, assuming that seafarers' decisions were determined only by issues internal to their profession. This was first argued by Michael Oppenheim in his influential nineteenth-century study of the Tudor and Stuart navy, and adopted practically wholesale by John Powell in his book on the civil war navy, as well as more recently by Greenberg and others. 29 The assumption is that sailors were either incapable of understanding, or were uninterested in, the debates taking place throughout Britain about the relationship between king and parliament, church and state. According to Powell they were 'simple, blunt, childlike men, upon whose minds the hardships of poverty, hunger and cold weighed heavily, to the exclusion of everything else. Moreover, the fleet was always a minority of the population of the British maritime community. Andrew Thrush suggested a naval population of between 5,000 and 10,000 in the war years of 1625 -30, dropping with the conclusion of peace and then rising again to somewhere around 4,500 in the later sixteen-thirties. 36 Thrush, Christopher Lloyd and Kenneth Andrews estimated the total number of seafarers in England (not Britain) at 20 -25,000 in 1629, a low point due to the preceding war years, and both Andrews and Thrush posited that considerable expansion occurred in the next decade. 37 Therefore, the navy never employed at one time more than half, and usually less than a quarter, of English, let alone British, seafarers.
The frequent fluctuation in naval personnel may have drawn in larger numbers of seafarers than these estimates suggest, but if it did, it also reduced the amount of time they were likely to spend in the navy. Some officers, including warrant officers, did remain in naval service for a long time, or at least claimed to have done so when petitioning the that men absented themselves from service, and the proclamations forbidding them to do so,
show that new sailors were constantly needed. 39 Pennington's journal for the sixteen-thirties records regular pressing of sailors, often to replace men he was simultaneously discharging.
40
If we are to believe the complaints of some naval officers, pressing often brought in men from a wide range of backgrounds, not just sailors.
41
The amount of seafarers who, in 1642, would have memories of naval service during the difficult years of the later sixteen-twenties and early sixteen-thirties is therefore questionable. 42 This is supported by the youth of many seafarers; a large proportion of those at sea in the sixteen-forties would have been infants two decades earlier. Of London seafarers appearing in the admiralty court in 1640 -2, 60 per cent were under thirty-five, of whom approximately one-third were under twenty-five, and another third aged between twenty-five and thirty. 43 Seafaring careers could begin before the age of twenty, so it is possible that some of these men had formative experiences of neglect in the Caroline navy; but it seems quite unlikely that all or even many of them did. 44 Also, a large proportion of the maritime community appear to have been only temporary, moving between seafaring and other trades, so that even older seafarers from the sixteen-forties may not have been at sea during the sixteen-twenties. even if some sailors did serve continuously in the royal fleet for three decades, this does not necessarily mean that they harboured a burning resentment against both the navy and the king. Indeed, at a time when alternative maritime employment was readily available, and usually much more generously paid, long naval service would suggest the opposite. 47 .
Moreover, while complaints of neglect and discontent continue into the early sixteen-thirties, including those concerning pay owed from the sixteen-twenties, they become progressively less numerous and strident. 48 Partially this was a result of peace: the administration was not subjected to the same debilitating strain as it had been during the war years of the previous decade.
It was also the outcome of Charles's sustained campaign to expand and improve the navy, extending central control and combating corruption, and raising the controversial 'ship money' levy to fund large, regular fleets, which provided much-needed experience. 49 Charles also raised the pay of sailors for the first time since Elizabeth, which in his opinion should have ensured their loyalty -it seems that he, too, misjudged the motivations of seafarers.
50
More recently historians have been less condemnatory in their judgements of Charles's naval activity during the sixteen-thirties. 51 While it is perhaps dangerous to argue from silence, the lack of organized complaint during the later sixteen-thirties, considering that sailors were prepared to protest so volubly during the sixteen-twenties, suggests that conditions had improved, or that too few sailors were now affected by them to result in widespread protest. Another interpretation has been advanced by Nabil Matar who, as an expert on Ottoman and north African history, brings a valuable international perspective, and whose suggestions are more persuasive because they are relevant to the whole maritime community, though they are essentially another variation on the 'neglect' theme which again assumes that seafarers were primarily occupied by maritime issues. 52 His argument does not in fact relate explicitly to the July episode when the fleet sided with parliament, but rather to the causes of the civil war as a whole. Matar points to the rise in the activity of north African corsairs, both within the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic, which created a 'crisis of captivity' for European sailors. 53 Large numbers of European seafarers were captured and spent some time imprisoned or enslaved in Tunis, Algiers or other Maghreb ports: David Hebb estimates that some 7,000
English captives were taken in 1622-42. 54 Under Elizabeth, Matar argues, a number of policies had been pursued to counter this threat, including state-supported ransoms for captured seafarers. By contrast, the early Stuart governments failed to provide similar schemes, allowing sailors to remain imprisoned despite repeated petitions from their wives and families. 55 It was during Charles's reign, too, that
Magharibi corsairs attacked Britain itself in raids which carried away captives from Lundy and Baltimore. 56 Matar may be right to suggest that these developments created a sense of danger, and disappointment with the royal government, in the merchant and maritime communities, though his claims for their role in causing the civil wars are perhaps overstated. 57 However, the situation was not such a clear case of decline from Elizabethan to Stuart times, which is a common narrative in maritime history. 58 Though he was, perhaps, not as committed as Elizabeth to protecting British seafarers, or at least less successful at it, Charles did pursue some policies to guard the maritime community. In 1626 he concluded a peace with Salé which saw the release of all English prisoners, though hostilities were later renewed. 59 An expedition led by William Rainsborough blockaded Salé in 1637 and, though this did not destroy that corsair base, it did result in the release of 293 English captives. 60 Rainsborough certainly thought it successful enough to suggest a similar action against
Algiers the following year, though this never took place, probably due to the developing British crisis. 61 Matar's argument is also focused very narrowly upon the activities of those based in the Maghreb, but the actions of European forces, most importantly those based at Dunkirk, would also have contributed to any sense of vulnerability among the seafaring community, even if Europeans were less interested in capturing sailors for ransom. 62 Certainly, in 1640-2, there were complaints about Dunkirk and Calais as well as Algiers or Tunis. 63 In addition, Matar's argument may have unexplored implications for our understanding of the 'ship money' fleets. The government justified collection of 'ship money'
by the emergency situation, claiming it was intended explicitly to counteract piracy and to protect British trade. This has often been seen by historians as a duplicitous pretext for a navy which was, in effect, a diplomatic tool aimed against the Dutch and French (Kenneth Andrews also dismisses Rainsborough's expedition as a 'side-show'). 64 It seems, however, that this is over-emphasizing a distinction not necessarily understood at the time, and giving too much attention to the complaints of particular officers, among them Pennington. 65 Certainly, as vice-admiral, Pennington was well placed to comment on the affairs of the fleets, but other officers passed more positive judgements, Sir William Monson claiming that they 'produced both renown and safety to [Charles] expedition.
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The increase in both Magharibi and European piracy naturally caused concern within the maritime community as a threat both to individuals and to their livelihood, and the failure of the navy to prevent it may therefore have created a sense of anti-government disillusionment among the maritime community, but it is far from clear whether it prompted a unanimously hostile response to Charles's naval programme. Nor did parliament deliver redress as swiftly or efficiently as Matar claimed, although the initial moves made in 1640-2 probably appeared positive. As with the question of naval neglect, it seems difficult to explain the decisions of seafarers in 1640-2 solely in these terms.
A third interpretation has been suggested by Richard Harding, though this idea has not been fully explored. In a general history of the navy, Harding argued that the 'common seamen largely shared the loyalties of the seamen officers', and that these 'bonds of leadership [were] based upon a common heritage in the maritime community of merchants, shopkeepers, artisans, shipowners, masters and sailors'. More importantly, he contended that:
There had been no sudden revolution in the fleet. Professional tension had been rising during the late 1630 s and the close relationship between the seamen officers, Trinity House [the corporation of shipmasters], the Thames maritime community, the City merchants and Parliament gave that resentment a political focus.
Here again, the emphasis is upon seafarers' preoccupation with their own profession, and seas surrounding Britain than many of his predecessors. 75 This was partially a question of circumstances; in the early seventeenth century, following Grotius's Mare Liberum, the question of authority at sea exercised European governors and legal theorists alike. 76 At the same time, the rise of Dutch maritime power, and specifically in the sixteen-thirties the expansion of the French navy and increasing tensions between France and Britain, made this a practical issue. 77 Charles's anxiety is evident in his orders to captains that they should 'maintain the King's honour, and the regality of the Narrow Seas, if it should be questioned'. 78 They were 'to be the more jealous because some pretend to have an interest in the sovereignty of these seas', although when Pennington requested clarification as to who these pretenders were he received only a vague answer. In other, more concrete ways, the royal government interfered in maritime affairs. The king pursued a legal course to deny coastal towns traditional rights and perquisites of admiralty, in order to assert his own jurisdiction. 88 Charles also ordered that all British ships should bring their goods into British ports, because when they unloaded at foreign ports he was deprived of customs revenues; the master and merchant of one ship stopped by Captain Plumleigh were reported to 'storme much at the stay and refuse utterly to pay any Custome or composition as a thing unheard of till this time'. 89 It is revealing that this was criticized as an innovation, and opposition to it, and to other forms of maritime authority, continued in 'professional tension', a 'resentment' given 'political focus' during the sixteen-thirties: there were no major riots in that decade as there had been in the sixteen-twenties and would be again in the sixteen-forties. Yet they do hint that seafarers were brought more forcefully into contact with the state during Charles's personal rule, usually through the navy, and in ways not exactly calculated to engender a positive response. It could have been precisely this increased contact which drew seafarers into national debates. As with the question of naval neglect, or the impact of piracy, there is insufficient evidence to regard this as the decisive factor in July 1642, but it may, like them, have contributed towards the outbreak of civil war.
Some seafarers perhaps disliked the Stuart regime because of mistreatment during naval service, and preferred parliament because they promised better conditions and pay; some probably felt that Charles had not protected British trade from piracy as much as he should have done. Others could have resented the government's increased interference in maritime affairs, which in some ways challenged the vocational culture and independence of
seafarers.Yet none of these theories, based on a negative attitude towards Charles and his government, and solely dealing with the maritime sphere, adequately explains the apparently enthusiastic support for parliament within the fleet. We must integrate these arguments with a more careful survey of the available evidence, paying particular attention to the wider maritime community rather than just the navy. It is instructive, in this case, to compare the involvement of seafarers in popular protests and petitioning during the sixteen-twenties and sixteen-forties, as these provide the clearest evidence concerning the attitudes of the maritime community.
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The later sixteen-twenties were a time of political turmoil in London. Parliament and the king were repeatedly at loggerheads, there were frequently large crowds in Westminster, and in the east of the city sailors gathered to protest and riot in complaint over their treatment and pay. 92 Yet there are a few important characteristics of these riots which must be borne in mind. Significantly, they seem to have been isolated from similar protests elsewhere, and comprised mostly disgruntled seamen, and perhaps their families, as well as some soldiers; much protest took place aboard ship. 93 Moreover, the targets of larger, London-based protests were clearly the naval administrators. In October 1626, an order was given to restrain the 'disorderly repair of mariners and soldiers to London' to demand pay, and when they confronted the duke of Buckingham, then admiral, he initially made promises, but afterwards forbade them to come to court. 94 In late 1627 and early 1628, the navy commissioners complained that mariners 'doe much trouble, and interrupt us at o[u]r meetings', and that unless they were paid 'nothing can bee expected but a sudden mutinie'; the government consequently threatened the sailors with the city's militia. 95 In addition, the demands of the sailors clearly concern only immediate material grievances: within the navy, the complaints are almost entirely about the lack of pay or supplies, which are supported by similar criticisms from naval officers. 96 Mariners also requested the king to 'curb the over-daring Enemie'. 97 Similar complaints, again focused on wages and the conditions of trade, were articulated in a petition to parliament in 1628. 98 We should, though, be careful about complaints concerning the state of trade: these were perennial and perhaps represent a similar sensitivity to subsistence levels to that found in agrarian communities. 99 collective mutinies aboard individual ships to large-scale crowd actions in London, as emerging from the same grievances, and influenced by a tradition of labour protest by which sailors sometimes negotiated the conditions of their employment. It is in the same period, according to Kenneth Andrews, that mutiny was increasing among seafarers, due to the expansion in trade and consequently the demand for seafaring labour. 100 Certainly, there was anxiety in the government over the tactics sailors used to protest; writing signatures in a circle, and the 'common answer of One and All', by which seafarers avoided any individual being singled out as ringleader, were prohibited by the admiralty court in 1631. 101 It therefore seems reasonable to locate the protests of the sixteen-twenties within this tradition of mutiny, as they were confined to the maritime community, and provoked by issues arising from naval employment and the decline of trade during wartime.
It is difficult to see the protests of the early sixteen-forties in the same way, though the actions of individual seafarers may still have been shaped by these conventions of labour protest. In some popular political actions, admittedly, the distinct concerns of the community are apparent. Early in May 1641, some thousand sailors rioted near the Tower, protesting against the closing of ports; they pulled down some houses before the militia drove them off, killing three. 102 The crowd reportedly 'got the Flag of a ship' before they marched on the Tower, implying an element of deliberate political theatre and perhaps the sense that this was a specific seafaring matter, though their choice of target, the principal fortress of the country rather than the offices of the naval administration, is significant. 103 There is only one mention of 'insolencies and misdemeano [u] rs' among sailors aboard a naval ship, in July 1641, which appears to be over lack of money. 104 Disorder was more widespread, though: in May 1642
Trinity House passed an 'Act touching disordered Seamen', describing 'daily complaints of the disorders of Seamen and of theire want of care, and honestie, in not attendinge and lyeing aboard theire shipps aswell here in the River before they goe forth as alsoe after they come home', and authorizing masters to fine mariners who were tardy after being hired. 105 However, during the sixteen-forties sailors joined riots which involved a wide range of society, especially apprentices and other young people. 107 The mention of these specific hamlets, where seafarers were numerous, and the inclusion of Trinity House in this order, suggests a large number of mariners were involved in the riot. According to one observer, in the winter of 1641 seamen and watermen again 'came by water before Whitehall' in barges, at the same time as large crowds of apprentices gathered outside
Westminster. 108 Clearly, the maritime community were not interested only in the conditions of the shipping industry: rather, issues specific to seafaring were popularly and publicly linked to the wider crisis in Britain. In none of the public statements purporting to come from seafarers during these years is there any mention of naval mistreatment and neglect, and in most, anxiety about maritime employment was associated with the political debates of the day, in particular the clash of religious identities which had begun to tear Britain apart. A petition submitted to the House of Lords by 'young Men, Apprentices and Seamen' on 26 January 1642, and subsequently printed, complained of suffering 'unsupportable pressures' because 'Trading is extraordinarily decayed', which suggests a preoccupation with material concerns.
However, the petition blamed this on 'that abominable Rebellion of the bloody Papists' in Ireland, which had begun the previous October, and requested that 'the Kingdome at home may be speedily put into such a posture of Warre and defence, as may enable them against all forreigne Invasion, and domestique plots, and conspiracies of Papists, and their adherents'. 109 On 14 January, the House of Commons had appointed a committee to consider 'putting the Kingdom into a Posture of Defence', suggesting that the drafters of the petition were well informed about attitudes in parliament. 110 As it was Warwick who introduced this petition to the Lords, it could suggest that some leading figures in the maritime community were already working closely with him. 111 A very similar petition from 'the marriners and sea-men, inhabitants in, and about the ports of London', supposedly 'subscribed by many thousands', had been submitted to the House of Commons earlier in the month. 112 Likewise, an anonymous Generall remonstrance or declaration of the sea-men, dated 31 January, described its subjects as 'wee of the true Protestant Religion', and, while addressing Charles in respectful terms, primarily requested letters of marque against the Irish. 113 These petitions, and possibly also the Remonstrance, suggest that a number of mariners were aware of, concerned about, and involved in political developments on a national scale.
It is no coincidence that these documents originated in January 1642, a particularly fraught month during which Charles, having failed in his attempt to arrest five members of the Commons and one peer, fled London. 114 The petition to the Commons was in fact submitted to a committee of the House sitting at the Guildhall in the midst of this crisis. 115 Some 2,000 sailors took part in the procession which triumphantly returned these five to
Westminster later in the month, and the longest discussion of seafarers' political activity is found in The seamans protestation concerning their ebbing and flowing to . . . Westminster, a justification of these actions. 116 Some historians, usually because of an assumption that sailors were largely illiterate, have been reluctant to see this text as genuinely representative of the maritime community. Powell claimed that it had been written by 'a far abler hand than that of an ordinary seaman', and more recently Brian Lavery declared that it 'was far too literate and politically sophisticated to be the work of the average seaman'.
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The fact that it was published on Warwick's order may indeed suggest that it was a piece of parliamentarian propaganda. However, it could still have been produced by a seafarer, perhaps one of the Trinity House clique of shipmasters who were to take naval commands during the war, some of whom, for example William Batten, had previously published complex navigational texts. 118 These were presumably not what Powell and Lavery had in mind for 'ordinary' or 'average' sailors, but they were nevertheless influential members of the maritime community, and literacy among seafarers appears to have been higher than previously thought. 119 The pamphlet, then, should not be dismissed so lightly.
The seamans protestation suggests a great deal of sensitivity to both the impact of seafarers' involvement in political demonstrations, and the interpretations likely to be placed upon this. It attempts to defend seafarers from potential accusations of meddling in affairs beyond their station, or even of rebellion. The pamphlet opens by acknowledging that 'Ovr appearance above the Bridge, being a passage the Histories of England cannot exemplifie, may cause our good intents and well-meaning, in the various apprehensions of most men to be misconstrued'. The author maintained that the sailors were not called by parliament, but came 'of our own free voluntarie disposition . . . as well to protect White-hall, had his
Majestie been there, as the Parliament house'. 120 The main concerns of the pamphlet were characterized in religious terms; enemies were defined as 'Papists', and seafaring described as a defence of Protestantism, the author adding that 'although we have no Churches, we say our prayers as well as you, the same God you have at shore is ours at sea'. 121 The
Protestation concluded with an oath supposedly sworn by mariners, to defend religion 'as it was established in the dayes of Queen Elisabeth', to protect the king and parliament, and 'from my heart to abhor all Poperie'. 122 This was, as John Walter noted, closely modelled on another 'Protestation oath' sworn throughout London on the orders of parliament. 123 In the Toomes, Cooke and the gunner all claimed that they 'never thought or said such thinge or thinges', though that is not a surprising response to a charge of treason. 144 These scant and contested accusations thus cannot be taken to indicate wholesale disaffection among the fleet and the maritime community, and there are no similar reports for later in the sixteen-forties, for example the reaction in the fleet to the Irish rebellion which seems to have flared passions so dramatically in Stepney. Nevertheless, the very existence of such accusations, and their detail, is compelling evidence for sensitivity to the religious and political issues then causing divisions across Britain, and hint at the existence of animated, informed and sustained debate among sailors, from 'common seamen' to ships' captains. In the light of this evidence, it is impossible to treat all seafarers as politically ignorant and motivated only by economic conditions.
In particular, religion appears as the major motivating factor in mobilizing a significant proportion of the maritime community both to support and to oppose parliament, with a particular crisis occurring in January 1642, a response to Charles's attempted arrest of five members of the Commons and one lord, and internal disputes within the Thames parishes, resulting from panic over the Irish rebellion. Though John Adamson has recently criticized the idea of the civil wars as England's 'wars of religion', a phrase first employed by John Morrill, and though the concern over other political issues such as illegal taxation is also apparent, religion is the consistent thread which links together the dispute in Stepney, the rioting throughout 1640-2 and seemingly the disquiet in the fleet. 145 That is not to suggest that there was a coherent religious underground, uniting all of those seafarers dissatisfied with the religious situation in Britain and seeking a different church establishment. Rather, as a number of historians have recently concluded, of all the diverse factors which pushed people into civil war, it appears that religion -or fear and paranoia associated with religious identities -was the most widespread and the most emotive.
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What emerges most powerfully from this evidence is that seafarers, though undeniably (and quite expectedly) interested in issues of maritime employment and naval policy, did not focus upon these questions to the exclusion of the broader political situation. On the contrary, the sources show that seafarers explicitly drew attention to the identity they shared with coreligionists and reacted to major national events as much as to specific maritime ones. They were hardly 'outcasts'. However, the stereotype of the 'seaman' should not be discounted, for seafarers themselves played upon it in their public actions. It is important, too, to acknowledge the substantial variety between seafarers; not all of them were religiously and politically committed, and of those that were, not all were parliamentarian in their
sympathies. Yet the parliamentarians among them, some at least associated with Warwick and present both in London's eastern suburbs and the royal fleet, could not have appealed successfully in the language they did if these sentiments had been totally absent. intermediaries of cultural and economic contact. They also lived within local and national frameworks, and shared identities with the society from which they originated as well as on the level of a vocational seafaring community. The two dimensions were not distinct but contributed symbiotically to one another: both form part of the vast and multifaceted story that maritime history can tell, and the real challenge is to approach both.
In 1995, Frank Broeze argued that 'Once our own house is in order and doubts about our identity and purpose are erased, the task of integrating maritime history into general history . . . can be pursued with conviction and confidence'. 149 The persistence among maritime historians of a 'siege mentality' and 'sense of crisis', which Broeze noted, suggests that he had it the wrong way round. 150 Only by integrating maritime history into 'general history', by engaging with the debates of other historical fields, can 'doubts about our identity and purpose' be resolved. Perhaps, in this respect, it is worth returning to David J. Starkey and Basil Greenhill's argument, made twenty-five years ago, that maritime history is not a discipline with its own methodology, but a dimension of history as a whole. 151 Seafarers stand at the crux of many historical developments: to understand them we therefore need to place them in relation both to their global impact and to their relationships with society ashore. We need to see them not only aboard ship but everywhere else. We need to think outside the gundeck.
